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I. INTRODUCTION
Charlie has been a polymath in his scholarship. Although his primary
topic has been employment discrimination, he has written on a variety of
topics within and outside employment law ranging from faithless servants1
to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.2 So I decided to ask Charlie for help in
deciding on my topic for this symposium. I asked him what his favorite
article was. He lamented that friends can be annoying when they force one
to become introspective (it is always satisfying to annoy Charlie), but
nevertheless he reported that his favorite article was The World Turned
Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males.3 I decided to
make that article the central focus of my contribution to this symposium,
but expanded the topic a bit to include the rest of his scholarship on the

*

Judge Harry A. Spencer Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
Thanks to Bill Corbett, Tim Glynn, Tristin Green, Ramona Paetzold, Stewart Schwab, Mike
Selmi, and Charlie Sullivan for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777 (2011).
2 Neil B. Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New
Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 453 (1983).
3 Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by
White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004) [hereinafter Sullivan, Upside Down].
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disparate impact doctrine.
The main theme of this article is that Charlie makes us think about
things in new and interesting ways. This will not be an article that attempts
to survey and integrate Charlie’s views about disparate impact across all his
articles on the topic. Instead, it will be a series of riffs on ideas that Charlie
has raised in the area. Charlie is such an insightful and provocative scholar
that many riffs are possible; I will limit myself to a few.
Charlie began thinking about disparate impact in 1975 almost as soon
as it had emerged as a concept. Four years after the seminal case Griggs v.
Duke Power Company,4 he noodled5 about how the recently enacted South
Carolina Human Affairs Law would be interpreted and, as part of that, he
considered Griggs.6 In the first section of this article, I will recount how
incredibly prescient Charlie was in that article.
Then, after a break (of about 30 years, but who’s counting?), he
published his favorite piece on this or any topic, The World Turned Upside
Down.7 In that article and others,8 he reviewed the various theories that
have been forwarded to rationalize the disparate impact concept. In
Section II, I will talk about the interesting problems presented by the theory
(or, maybe better, non-theory) of disparate impact.
A couple years later, Charlie published Disparate Impact: Looking
Past the Desert Palace Mirage.9 The central claim in this article was that
disparate impact is a powerful anti-discrimination tool, better in many ways
than disparate treatment. He encouraged plaintiffs to use it more often. In
Section III, I will not only agree with Charlie, but double down on his
claim.
Most recently, Charlie published Employing AI.10 The question he
addressed in this article was what does thinking about artificial intelligence
tell us about disparate impact. (He also asked what it tells us about
disparate treatment, but that is not the topic here.) In Section IV, I focus on
one of his main conclusions: employment outcomes driven by AI, almost

4

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
I discovered at the symposium that this word was used by Charlie and his good
friend, Mike Zimmer, when they thought something was worth thinking about.
6 Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, The South Carolina Human Affairs Law:
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? (pts. 1 & 2), 26 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1974), 27 S.C. L. REV.
1 (1975) [hereinafter Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward].
7 Sullivan, Upside Down, supra note 3.
8 See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 964–66 (2005) [hereinafter Sullivan, Mirage]; Sullivan,
Upside Down, supra note 3, at 1521–23.
9 Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8.
10 Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018).
5
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by definition, will be correlated with some sort of business necessity
because that is what AI does. But AI correlates in a particularly complex,
effective, and often, obscure way. So, Charlie asks, should we think about
bare correlations as business justifications differently? Charlie’s answer,
by my lights right again (as usual for Charlie), is that yes, we probably
should. I agree again, but add some of my own thoughts and musings.
Finally, in Section V, I return to Charlie’s favorite article, The World
Turned Upside Down. The basic question he addressed there was whether
disparate impact claims by Whites and males should be cognizable under
Title VII. Charlie’s clear opinion was that the doctrine should not be
available to White and male plaintiffs, but he somewhat reluctantly
concluded that it must be available, otherwise the whole doctrine would be
in constitutional jeopardy. In Section V, I focus on an issue Charlie raises
in that article: just how many more claims would we expect to see if
disparate impact were expanded to cover such claims?11
II. IN THE BEGINNING . . .
First, an observation: Charlie really was there at the beginning.
Although there were glimmers earlier, disparate impact doctrine really
began in 1971 with Griggs. Charlie was there practically at birth; he
published his first article on the topic in 1975. For most of us in the field,
we have only known disparate impact from the time of its adolescence, or
for some perhaps even its adulthood. But Charlie was practically one of
disparate impact’s midwives. For context, compare it with another area he
has written in: antitrust. (See Figure 1 below.) Even Charlie probably does
not personally remember much about the details of its birth in the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890,12 or the Clayton Act in 1914,13 or whenever you
want to date its birth.

11 Charlie published one other article focused on disparate impact in addition to the
four mentioned in the text: Charles A. Sullivan, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line or Just
Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. L. REV. 411 (2010). This was a
careful, early analysis of Ricci. Charlie’s answer to the question in the title, correct by my
lights, was that Ricci was just another turn in the road. The case was definitely interesting,
but because of its odd setting and its density, it was unlikely to have broad impact. Because
the case was such a cul-de-sac, I do not discuss this article here.
12 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)).
13 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2018)).
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Figure 1: The Lifespan of Disparate Impact, Antitrust, and Charlie’s
Scholarship on Each

An amazing thing about Charlie’s first article on disparate impact in
1975 is just how prescient he was about the kinds of issues that would
arise. For example:
• He says that Griggs (in combination with McDonnell Douglas)14
maybe approves, or at least holds open the possibility, that a cause
of action for discrimination could be made out even without
identifying a specific employment practice, by comparing the
composition of an employer’s workforce to demographic
statistics.15 Note that this is two years before Teamsters16 and
Hazelwood,17 the seminal cases introducing the systemic disparate
treatment theory of discrimination. So he was right, just not about
the theory being a part of disparate impact doctrine.
• He points out that extending disparate impact analysis to the Equal
Protection Clause would cause problems that are not present in
cases limited to the employment discrimination statutes.18 This
was a year before Washington v. Davis,19 which held that disparate
impact analysis was not cognizable under the Equal Protection
Clause.
• He discusses whether a factor that an employee can voluntarily
comply with can be attacked using disparate impact,20 predicting
Spun Steak21 (requiring bilingual employees to speak English) and
14

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 13–14.
16
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
17 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
18 Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 32–34.
19 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
20 Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 24–26.
21 Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an
English-only rule with a disparate impact against employees of Mexican origin did not
15
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Lanning22 (requiring people to train to run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes)
by about 20 and 30 years, respectively.23
• He discusses the problem of just which members of the protected
class should be entitled to a remedy after a disparate impact case is
made out. What about especially disloyal employees, as in
McDonnell Douglas? Or ones who would not have been hired
anyway for other reasons?24 Again, this was years before the twostage liability-then-remedies concept was developed.25
All in all, it was an amazingly prescient article.
III. SUSAN SONTAG AND THE THEORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Charlie discussed the theory of disparate impact in some of his
articles,26 as have I27 and many others.28 But none of the theories have been
widely accepted; all have flaws. Marcuse famously said that Susan Sontag
could make a theory out of a potato peel.29 Unfortunately, no Susan Sontag
violate Title VII because bilingual employees could voluntarily comply with the rule).
22 Lanning v. SEPTA, 308 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that an employment
test requiring applicants to run 1.5 miles within 12 minutes that had a disparate impact
against women was not a violation of Title VII because most women would be able to
comply with the requirement with moderate training).
23 This issue also arose under a later-enacted statute, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
12101–12213 (2018)). In three 1999 decisions, the Supreme Court held that individuals
who had limitations that could be corrected through a medical or physiological intervention
did not qualify as “individuals with a disability” under the ADA. These holdings were later
overturned by the 2008 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). For a
discussion, see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 450–51 (9th ed. 2017). Nevertheless, the issue still has
resonance after the ADAAA. See Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir.
2016) (holding that obesity did not qualify as an impairment under the ADA).
24 Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 22–27.
25 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361–62 (1977) (describing and
approving the two-stage remedial process).
26 See, e.g., Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8; Sullivan, Upside Down, supra note 3;
Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6.
27 Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and
Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799 (1985).
28 See, e.g., JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
(2014); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Owen M. Fiss, A
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971); George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV.
1297 (1987); Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1357 (2017).
29 Vivian Gornick, She Made Thinking Exciting: The Life and Work of Susan Sontag,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/books/review/sontagher-life-and-work-benjamin-moser.html (reviewing BENJAMIN MOSER, SONTAG: HER LIFE
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has arisen to solve the potato peel of disparate impact.
Charlie has a standard discussion of the theory of disparate impact
going through the list of possibilities. Disparate impact could be intended
to ferret out difficult-to-prove intentional discrimination. Or it could be a
way of limiting the temporal reach of past de jure discrimination or, more
broadly, any type of past discrimination or subordination. In Griggs, for
example, disparate impact limited the damage from unequal educational
opportunities. Or even more broadly, perhaps disparate impact is intended
to remove all unnecessary barriers to human advancement, to prohibit
obstacles that are not firmly tethered to ability to do the job. Like most of
us, Charlie does not find any of the theories convincing.30
Disparate impact presents a special case for discrimination theories.
As Charlie has said31 and as others in this symposium have noted,32
generally we begin with a theory about discrimination and then we develop
methods of proof. For example, a central theory in discrimination law is
that intentional discrimination on prohibited bases was the main target of
Title VII.33 From there, various methods of proof have been developed:
McDonnell Douglas, mixed motives, systemic disparate treatment. A
curious thing about disparate impact is that it sings that tune backwards,
especially after 1991. The 1991 amendments to Title VII specify a method
of proof for disparate impact cases without so much as a feint towards an
underlying theory.34
In a backhanded way, this raises the issue of just how important a
theory is anyway. What function does a theory serve? The standard
response is that theories work backwards by rationalizing a body of law
and, more importantly, work forwards to help predict future directions.35
Given this, Charlie’s Upside Down article is an example of the problems
that arise when a theory is absent or uncertain. Just how are we supposed
to decide (or predict) whether Whites and males ought to be able to bring
WORK (2019)). Sontag was a well-known public intellectual at the turn of the 21st
century. Marcuse did not say this as a compliment.
30 See generally Sullivan & Zimmer, Two Steps Forward, supra note 6.
31 Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 913.
32 See William R. Corbett, Explorations with Charlie Sullivan: Theorizing a Different
Universe of Employment Discrimination, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1283 (2020).
33 For an early, important statement of this oft-stated theory, see Paul Brest, Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
34 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)).
35 At a deeper level, a well-theorized law is more likely to be perceived by the public to
be sensible, fair, and worthy of support. See William R. Corbett, Babbling About
Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the
Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 689–93 (2010).
AND
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disparate impact cases if we have no theory?
In a case like disparate impact, the response might be that we are
better off without a theory. The statute provides a proof structure, so just
apply it. On Charlie’s question about disparate impact claims by White
males, that approach provides a pretty straightforward answer. We know
that Title VII has been symmetrical since 1976 for race and gender;36 the
1991 proof structure for disparate impact cases can be applied in a
straightforward fashion to claims by Whites and males; and nothing in the
1991 act even hints that the structure should not be applied to Whites and
males. Q.E.D.37
But in Upside Down, Charlie interprets the statute differently because
the Q.E.D. result is “ahistorical and lacking any apparent policy
justification.”38 The interesting twist here is that Charlie’s result is not one
that is theory free. Instead, it just pushes the theoretical analysis up one
level. Instead of articulating and relying on a theory of disparate impact
derived from the statute and case law, the result depends on a theory of
statutory interpretation. A straight-up textualist theory of statutory
interpretation would lead to the Q.E.D. result. But in Upside Down,
Charlie relies on a different theory—a purposivist theory. So at the end of
the day, maybe it is just not possible to go through life and law without a
theory, even if it has to be built out of potato peels.
IV. DOUBLING DOWN ON DISPARATE IMPACT
In Desert Palace Mirage, Charlie makes a cri de coeur for disparate
impact. His plea is to revive disparate impact, to use it more because it is
so useful.
His central claim in Desert Palace Mirage is that the intent-based
models—individual disparate treatment, especially, but also systemic
disparate treatment—just are not up to the task when we begin thinking, as
we have been, about cognitive biases resulting in discrimination.39 Implicit
bias and other cognition-based causes of discrimination pose two big
problems for the intent-based theories. First, the intent-based theories,
precisely because they are intent based, apply only awkwardly if at all to
discrimination caused by subconscious biases. And second, even if
implicit biases can meet the legal definition of intention, proving causation
36 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279–80 (1976); see infra
note 60.
37 Charlie notes this early in the Upside Down article. Sullivan, Upside Down, supra
note 3, at 1506.
38 Sullivan, Upside Down, supra note 3, at 1506–07.
39 See Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8.
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on such bases is exceedingly difficult.
Very interestingly—Charlie is an interesting guy—Charlie points out
that the cognitive bias movement and disparate impact are similar in that
both lessen the moral disapprobation of discrimination, while widening its
scope.40 But that is not Charlie’s main point and not the one I want to
focus on here.
Charlie’s main claim is that disparate impact solves, or at least greatly
minimizes, the analytical and proof problems presented by implicit
discrimination. With disparate impact, the proof is simply that the factor
had a disparate impact. We do not care what motivated use of the factor;
certainly, we do not care about whether the impact was the product of
intentional discrimination or not. As a result, we do not care if cognitive
biases had any role in producing the impact. These kinds of questions
about motivation are just irrelevant.
I agree with Charlie and, in fact, I would double down on Charlie’s
claim in a few additional ways. First, in the article, Charlie says litigating
under disparate impact will require expert testimony to prove disparate
impact—either about statistics, he says, or about cognitive bias.41 I am not
sure that is the case. Sometimes the disparate impact can be proven
without any expert statistical evidence. Consider Ricci v. DeStefano42 or
Connecticut v. Teal.43 In both those central cases, the proof of disparate
40

Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 983–84.
Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 993.
42 Ricci considered examinations administered for lieutenant and captain firefighter
positions. The Court reported the evidence of disparate impact:
Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination—43 whites,
19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed—25 whites, 6
blacks, and 3 Hispanics . . . . Forty-one candidates completed the captain
examination—25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates
passed—16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 566 (2009). These pass rates meant that the disparities
easily met the four-fifths rule for proving a cognizable disparate impact. Despite the paucity
(maybe absence) of expert testimony on the issue, the Court found and the parties did not
dispute that a prima facie case of disparate impact had been established. Id. at 586. But see
Joseph L. Gastwirth & Weiwen Miao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate
Impact Cases Provides Sounder Inferences than the U.S. Government’s ‘Four-Fifths’ Rule:
An Examination of the Statistical Evidence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY &
RISK 171, 171 (2009) (criticizing application of the four-fifths rule in Ricci).
43 Teal considered examinations administered for supervisor positions in the
Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut. The Court reported the
evidence of disparate impact:
Th[e] written test was administered . . . to 329 candidates. Of these
candidates, 48 identified themselves as black and 259 identified themselves
as white . . . . With the passing score set at 65, 54.17 percent of the identified
black candidates passed. This was approximately 68 percent of the passing
rate for the identified white candidates.
41
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impact was simple and perfectly sufficient. No expert testimony was
required.44 And as for expert testimony about cognitive bias, since proof of
intention or even the underlying cause of the disparity is not needed, it
would be the rare case where expert testimony on cognitive bias would be
relevant.
This is where I want to double down on Charlie’s analysis. A
linchpin of his analysis is that the underlying cause of a disparate impact is
irrelevant, and that is a major reason it can be a powerful tool.45 And
Charlie is exactly right that the underlying cause of the disparity does not
matter, and it does not matter big-time.
Consider a few implications from Griggs about how little it matters.
In Griggs, the high school diploma requirement had a disparate impact on
Blacks.46 That disparate impact may have been caused by discrimination,
for example, by the employer putting in the requirement to keep Blacks out
or because the state discriminated against Blacks in educational
opportunity. Both of these were probably true—and both were completely
irrelevant. Plaintiffs did not have to prove either of those things and it
would not have been a defense for the employer to disprove either of
them.47
Second, this blindness to causation means that a large number of very
minor causes can be accumulated in a way that disparate treatment does not
allow and, in fact, even completely unknown causes can result in a viable
claim. For example, say that Blacks in North Carolina got fewer high
school degrees because of the accumulation of ten or twenty or fifty small
factors—poorer childhood nutrition, fewer words spoken to them when
small children, weaker teachers, inadequate textbooks, crumbling
buildings, and so on. And let us say none of those factors can be proven to
be “the cause” of the disparity. With disparate impact, that does not matter.
We can consider the combined effect of all those factors and that is just
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982). As in Ricci, the Court found that these basic
statistics established a prima facie case of disparate impact. Id. at 448.
44 Of course, there was expert testimony in both cases. But the point here is that the
testimony was not required in either case to prove disparate impact. It was used for other
purposes.
45 Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 1001 (“Whether the ultimate cause [of a disparity]
was animus, rational discrimination, conscious or unconscious stereotyping, workplace
dynamics, or workplace culture would not matter [to establish a prima facie case].”).
46 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
47 Mike Selmi recognizes this feature of the disparate impact doctrine—that the
underlying cause of the disparity is legally irrelevant—but makes the interesting point that
changing perceptions about underlying causes may help explain the Court’s efforts to limit
disparate impact. See Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law:
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 955–66 (2014).
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fine. Note this is not disparate treatment where the plaintiff has to isolate
one factor—intent—and prove that it is an important factor, at least a
motivating factor and maybe more.48 There is no need to isolate or even
consider intent in a disparate impact case. In fact, let us say that North
Carolina is utopia and everything between Blacks and Whites is completely
equal. (Counterfactual, of course, in North Carolina and everywhere.) Yet
despite that, Blacks have a lower graduation rate. Do we care under
disparate impact? No, there is no burden on the plaintiff to explain the
impact in any way; all the plaintiff has to do is show the disparity. Again,
this is not disparate treatment.
Third, there is not even any burden to show that the factor had any
impact in the particular workplace. In Griggs, the employer also required a
minimum score on the Wonderlic test, which excluded half of all high
school graduates.49 So let us say, for discussion purposes, that the test
excluded almost all non-high school graduates and half of all high school
graduates. And let us say the Wonderlic test was business justified. If
there were one or two Black non-high school graduates who passed the test,
would their disparate impact claim on the graduation requirement be
undermined because the high school diploma requirement did not have a
disparate impact in this particular workplace, even though it did generally?
The standard model of disparate impact would say, no, it does not matter.
Plaintiffs do not have to prove the effect in each particular workplace—
rather, they have to prove that the factor would have screened out too many
Blacks if applied independently of all other factors.50
In sum, Charlie’s main claim in Desert Palace Mirage is right on
target. Disparate impact is a powerful anti-discrimination tool. It is a bit of
a mystery why it is used so seldom.51
48

See Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 925–38 (after reviewing the history of
disparate treatment discrimination, concluding that the plaintiff has the burden of isolating
an impermissible factor as a motivating or but-for factor).
49 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 402 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
50 See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A
View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 356 (1996). This is not an
incontrovertible proposition. See, e.g., Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d
1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 1986) (disparate impact claim by males fails because plaintiffs failed
to show a disproportionality in the actual workforce). But higher authority indicates that it
is true. First, Title VII requires focus on a “particular employment practice.” Title VII, §
703(k)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018). A different result would require
inquiry beyond the particular factor to investigate other factors simultaneously at play in the
particular workplace. In addition, this result is implied by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 442 (1982), which holds that an employment practice with a disparate impact is not
immunized because other factors at play in the workplace may obscure the effect of the
disparate impact.
51 Disparate impact discrimination is less favorable to plaintiffs than disparate
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V. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND STRATIFICATION
In Employing AI, Charlie considers how artificial intelligence
challenges (and exposes) our current conceptions of discrimination. On
disparate impact, he worries that, by its nature, AI will almost always be
able to prove business necessity if all that is required is a correlation
between the challenged employment practice and a good business
outcome.52 That, after all, is what AI does; it sorts through the available
data to find the best correlation between qualities an employee presents at
application and the employer’s preferred measures of a good employee.
But it is certainly possible that we will have no idea why that correlation
exists, or even exactly how the AI reached its result. The computer figured
it out by itself and it will not tell us. Even more plausibly, it is possible that
the reason a factor correlates with a good business outcome is opaque. For
example, it could be that the computer discovers that an applicant’s favorite
kind of music, whether she owns a car, or her zip code predicts
productivity.53 A solution to this problem is to require more than a mere
correlation to make out the business necessity defense. In addition, the
employer must present a reasonable explanation for why the challenged
factor leads to a better business outcome.54
For me, that brought to mind stratification and Susan Sontag.
Consider this situation: an employer requires a certain score on a test and
the plaintiff shows it has a disparate impact against women overall. (See
Table A.) But then the employer stratifies the same data and shows that if
you consider college graduates and non-graduates separately, there is no
disparate impact against women in either group. (See Table B.) Should
treatment discrimination on a number of dimensions, including the lack of a jury trial, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c); more limited remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); and statutory
exemptions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (exempting seniority systems); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(3) (exempting drug testing). But these marginal limitations are insufficient to
explain the low usage of disparate impact. See Sullivan, Mirage, supra note 8, at 968–69;
Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs
Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 597 (2004) (suggesting that the reason for the
under-use of disparate impact is that the practicing bar under-appreciates it).
52 Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 10, at 420–28.
53 These examples come from Charlie. Charles A. Sullivan, Comprehending Causation
& Correlation, JOTWELL (Aug. 4, 2017), https://jotwell.com/comprehending-causation-andcorrelation/. A well-known and disconcerting example of this outside of the employment
context occurred when the father of a teenage girl was surprised to learn that she was
pregnant from Target marketing. Target had developed pregnancy predictions, including
due dates, based on her consumer behavior. CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY
DO WHAT WE DO IN LIFE AND BUSINESS 182–97 (2012).
54 James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CAL.
L. REV. ONLINE 164, 170 (2017) (arguing that to prove business necessity, employers must
show that “its model’s scores are not just correlated with job performance but explain it”).
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that be a defense? Note a few things. This is not bottom line and
Connecticut v. Teal. Only one employment practice is at issue here.55 But
it is similar to bottom line in that if you stratify you can get any
combination of results.56 For example, in this case, a disparate impact
exists overall, but not in either of the two subgroups. But you could also
see a disparate impact overall, but only in one of the two subgroups. Or
you could see the converse: a plaintiff using stratification offensively when
no disparate impact exists overall, but there is a disparate impact against
one or both of the subgroups.57 Lest this seem insignificant, consider that
there is almost an infinite number of ways to stratify the overall group—
here I did it by education, but it could be by time, or age, or hair color, or
height, or whatever. What to think about this?
Table A: Disparate Impact Overall

Men
Women

Pass
400
200

Fail
200
200

Total
600
400

Pass Rate
0.66
0.50

Four-Fifths Rule
0.76

55 Connecticut v. Teal involved a situation where an employment test used for
promotions had a disparate impact against blacks, but a set of other employment practices
counter-balanced the results of the test so that blacks received their proportionate share of
promotions. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1982). Thus, the class of cases
covered by Teal requires at least two employment practices that counter-balance each other.
In this example, there is only one employment practice. The “counter-balancing” occurs by
considering the single employment practice’s adverse impact across different populations.
56 This situation and Teal give rise to a common misunderstanding about these types of
two-factor situations. In Teal, for example, it seems only logical that if the employment test
had a disparate impact against blacks but when other factors were applied there was no
disparate impact, then the other factors by themselves must not have had a disparate impact
against blacks, indeed, they must have had a disparate impact against whites. Charlie and I
have both used our “common sense” to make this incorrect claim. Sullivan, Upside Down,
supra note 3, at 1511 (“logically” in Teal since the test had a disparate impact against blacks
but promotions overall did not, the other factors used had to have a disparate impact against
whites); Willborn, supra note 27, at 829 (“One is certain when a system has a disparate
impact that an element or combination of elements of that system also has a disparate
impact.”). But that is simply not the case. This seems to violate “common sense” but it is
true; there is good reason that the example illustrated in Tables A and B is referred to as an
aggregation paradox. See, e.g., Clifford H. Wagner, Simpson’s Paradox in Real Life, 36
AM. STATISTICIAN 46 (1982).
57
For a detailed discussion of the possibilities and legal responses to them, see
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 50, at 336–42, 387–97.
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Table B: Disparate Impact Stratified by Education

Non-College Graduates
Men
Women
College Graduates
Men
Women

Pass

Fail

Total

Pass
Rate

Four-Fifths
Rule

150
115

200
180

350
295

0.43
0.39

0.91

250
85

0
20

250
105

1.00
0.81

0.81

Interestingly, the solution to the stratification issue may be the same
one that Charlie accepts in Employing AI. That is, the employer can defend
by stratifying, but only if it can demonstrate that the stratification makes
sense.58 So in my case, it would not make sense, for example, if the
stratification to explain a difference in test scores was by height and,
conversely, an education stratification would not make sense if the factor
being challenged was a height requirement. The appropriate rule would be
that the employer can defend by stratifying only if the stratifying variable is
closely related to the employer’s business interests. Similarly, plaintiffs
can use stratification offensively only if they can provide a reasonable
explanation for why stratifying on the variable makes sense. This is very
similar to the rule suggested in Employing AI: a bare correlation between
the employment practice and a business outcome is not enough to establish
a business necessity defense. The employer also has to provide a
reasonable explanation for the correlation.
This is where Susan Sontag comes in. These two separate problems—
AI correlations and stratification—seem to have a similar solution. Perhaps
there is a theory in there somewhere. Perhaps there is a general rule that
statistical correlations should have legal significance in discrimination
cases only where they are accompanied by a reasonable, normative
explanation. The problem with this, however, is that systemic disparate
treatment discrimination depends on almost the opposite. In the normal
case, statistical proof of systemic disparate treatment occurs only if an
explanation for a disparity is absent after accounting for other explanatory
factors.59 So maybe there is no general principle, or maybe we just have
58
59

For a detailed discussion, see Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 50, at 387–97.
The seminal case phrases it in precisely those terms:
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not yet found our Susan Sontag to make sense of these potato peels.
VI. THE TURN TOWARDS MERITOCRACY
Let us return to the main topic, Charlie’s Upside Down article. The
issue Charlie addressed in Upside Down was whether disparate impact
should be symmetrical or not: should it be as available to White males as to
the groups with histories of employment discrimination that the law was
primarily intended to protect?60
One thing Charlie says in thinking about this is that permitting
disparate impact to be symmetrical would, as he puts it, “shift national
employment sharply towards a meritocracy.”61 Since almost every neutral
factor an employer uses would be challengeable by men or women,
employers would need to justify (or be prepared to justify) virtually all of
their employment practices. This, Charlie says, would have a significant
philosophical effect. The shift would be from the standard antidiscrimination approach of requiring employees to prove bad reasons for an
employment decision to one in which employers would have to provide

[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative
of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (emphasis added).
The comparison between the two situations, however, is more fraught than I imply in the
text, and I do not explore it extensively here. In rough terms, in the disparate impact
situation, the claim is that an employment practice with a disparate impact can be used only
if it can be justified by a correlation with an articulable and positive business outcome.
Similarly, one can stratify only on bases that are business related. In the systemic disparate
treatment situation, however, the question is quite different: absent discrimination, how
likely is it that one would see a particular outcome? Or more particularly in the regression
context, after accounting for other factors, how likely is it that one would see a prohibited
characteristic as a significant predictor of particular outcomes, such as salaries? See Steven
L. Willborn & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 48,
56–60 (2009). Thus, in the former a correlation avoids a finding of discrimination, while in
the latter it results in an inference of discrimination. One is direct, the other is inferential.
On the other hand, the two situations may be the same. In both, the ability to explain the
employment practice or outcome based on business-related factors avoids discrimination,
while the inability to do so results in a direct finding of illegality for disparate impact and an
inference of illegality for systemic disparate treatment. Susan?
60 Mostly since Charlie’s article was published, the issue of symmetry has received
interesting scholarly attention. See Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C.
L. REV. 1085 (2017); Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry in Antidiscrimination
Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69 (2017). Cf. Saul Levmore, Title VII to Tinder: Law’s
Antidiscrimination Asymmetry and Occasional Market Superiority, 68 ALA. L. REV. 877
(2017) (focusing on the law’s asymmetrical application to sellers and employers vs. buyers
and employees).
61 Sullivan, Upside, supra note 3, at 1512.
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good, business-related reasons for their employment practices.62
Charlie does not attempt to quantify how many more policies would
be subject to attack under a symmetrical approach, but the implication is
that it would be a lot more. But is that the case? Just how should we think
about how many more policies would require justification under a
symmetrical disparate impact? Would it be twice as many since now both
men and women could challenge policies?63 Or are there reasons to think it
would be fewer than that?
Figure 2 was my first cut at thinking about this issue. The horizontal
axis is every possible pass rate for women on a particular employment
practice from 0 percent to 100 percent and the vertical axis is the same for
men. As a result, the figure reflects each of the 10,000 (100 times 100)
possible relationships between the pass rates of women and men. The light
blue area with horizontal lines is every cognizable disparate impact
against men, that is, every disparate impact that satisfies the four-fifths
rule. For example, if the female pass rate is 100 percent (at the far right),
then every male pass rate below 80 percent would be a cognizable disparate
impact. Similarly, if the female pass rate is 50 percent (at the middle of the
horizontal scale), then every male pass rate below 40 percent would be a
cognizable disparate impact. And the same is true for disparate impacts
against women in the purple area with vertical lines.
In this way of thinking about the issue, four-fifths of all possible
relationships between male and female pass rates result in a cognizable
disparate impact and, conversely, one-fifth do not. More to the point of
Upside Down, Figure 2 illustrates that a symmetrical disparate impact
doctrine would double the number of employment practices that would
have to be justified. Under a non-symmetrical doctrine only the disparate
impacts against women would be cognizable: the two-fifths (40 percent) in
the purple area with vertical lines. Under a symmetrical approach, the
disparate impacts against both men and women would be cognizable: the
four-fifths (80 percent) in both the colored areas.

62

Id.
To simplify the discussion, I’ve limited the inquiry to symmetry between men and
women. Obviously, Charlie’s article itself is broader than that; it also considers extending
disparate impact to White persons. And the implications are even broader than that.
63
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Figure 2: Universe of Possible Disparate Impacts Against Men and
Women

The problem with Figure 2 is that it treats every one of those 10,000
possible outcomes as equally likely.64 But that does not seem right, or even
close to right. Figure 3 presents another way of looking at it. Figure 3
plots the effects of the universe of employment practices on women. The
vertical axis is the number of employment practices and the horizontal axis
is the disparate impact of the practices on women. A test with equal pass
rates for men and women is right in the middle of the horizontal axis and
then the tests have a greater disparate impact against women as you
proceed to the left and in favor of women (against men) as you proceed to
the right. For example, at 1.0 in the middle of the horizontal axis, men and
women would have exactly equal pass rates, while at 0.2 on the left side,
64 The actual number of possible outcomes is infinity, not 10,000. 10,000 is the
number of possible outcomes if one rounds each possible outcome to a whole number (100
times 100). But, of course, an infinite number of outcomes are possible within each of those
whole numbers. But 10,000 seemed more than enough to report for these purposes, and a
bit more comprehensible.
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the pass rate for women would be 20 percent of the pass rate for men.65
The idea here is that employment practices are distributed across the
figure in a normal bell curve. Most of the employment practices are in the
middle of the horizontal axis and, thus, have no disparate impact.
Increasingly fewer practices exist as one moves towards either end of the
horizontal axis where cognizable disparate impacts occur against women to
the left and against men to the right.
Figure 3 sets 1.0 as the median with a standard deviation of 0.30. If
this is how employment practices are distributed, only the shaded areas
would have a cognizable disparate impact against women and men,
respectively. The shaded area for women is 25 percent of all the
employment practices and the shaded area for men is slightly less than
that.66 The rest of the employment practices—slightly more than 50
percent—would not present a cognizable disparate impact and, as a result,
would not have to be business justified. Note that this is quite different
from the 80 percent that would have to be justified if all disparate impacts
were equally likely, as in Figure 2.

65 For example, it could be 20 percent of women and 100 percent of men passing or 10
percent of women and 50 percent of men passing.
66 Figure 3 views the universe of employment practices based on their adverse impact
on women, that is, it is a normal distribution based on the pass rate of women divided by the
pass rate of men. That means that a cognizable disparate impact against women occurs in
the space to the left of 0.8, the space that includes all the pass rates for women that are less
than four-fifths the pass rates of men. Since the figure is plotting the impact on women, the
pass rates have to be inverted to determine the point at which a disparate impact becomes
cognizable against men. Although 1.2 seems as if it should be the right point, the actual
number is 1.25. If women are passing at 1.25 times the rate of men, then men are passing at
80 percent the rate of women (1.0 divided by 1.25 = .80). If the figure viewed the universe
of employment practices based on the adverse impact against men instead of against
women, one would see the inverse of this figure, that is, there would be slightly more
cognizable disparate impacts against men than against women. A third option would be to
plot women and men separately. If that were done to reflect that men and women were
affected in the same manner (rather than one in relation to the other), then each plot would
have a cognizable disparate impact to the left of 0.8 and each would constitute 25 percent of
all employment practices.
I chose this figure because it best illustrates my points visually and because it best
reflects the notion in Charlie’s article that the issue is whether male claims should be added
to the already well-recognized claims by women. But ultimately, all lead to the same basic
outcome.
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Figure 3. Frequency of Cognizable Disparate Impact Against
Women and Men | Median of 1.0 (No Disparate Impact); 0.30 Standard
Deviation

But consider two other possibilities within this framework. First, as
illustrated in Figure 4, it could be that the standard deviation is less than
0.30 so that the tests are more bunched up in the middle. Figure 4 has a
standard deviation of half that of Figure 3 (0.15 rather than 0.30). If this is
the case, even fewer employment practices would present a cognizable
disparate impact and be subject to business justification. In this figure
again, a cognizable disparate impact occurs only in the shaded areas.
Those areas account for only about 9 percent of employment practices for
women and men, respectively, so about 82 percent of all employment
practices would not need to be business justified.
Figure 4.Frequency of Cognizable Disparate Impact Against Women and
Men | Median of 1.0 (No Disparate Impact); 0.15 Standard Deviation

Alternatively, it could be that the median disparate impact of all
employment practices is not 1.0, but instead that more practices have a
disparate impact against women than against men. Figure 5 is similar to
Figure 3 in that it has a standard deviation of 0.30, but the median test leans
against women and favors men. Figure 5 sets the median test at 0.8 for
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women. In this world, half the employment practices would present a
disparate impact against women and be subject to business justification, but
less than 10 percent of the practices would present a cognizable disparate
impact against men and be subject to business justification. Recognizing
symmetrical claims would increase the number of employment practices
subject to business justification by about 15 percent, not 100 percent as in
Figures 3 and 4.
Figure 5.Frequency of Cognizable Disparate Impact Against Women and
Men | Median of 0.8 (Disparate Impact Against Women); 0.30 Standard
Deviation

How should we think about the refinements of Figures 4 and 5? My
intuition is that both are likely to be true to some extent. Employers are
very aware of the possibility of a disparate impact lawsuit, so they are
likely to shy away to the extent possible from extreme disparate impacts
and, instead, try to construct their employment practices to be race and
gender neutral. This in fact is one of the recurrent worries of those opposed
to disparate impact doctrine,67 although it can be done in non-nefarious
ways.68 Since this is the case, the universe of employment practices over
time is likely to tend towards neutrality, to bunch up in the middle of the
distribution, to look more like Figure 4 than Figure 3.
Similarly, there are a number of reasons to think that the median
disparate impact is not 1.0 but instead leans against women. For example,
67 See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643 (1989) (to avoid
disparate impact claims, “the only practicable option would be the adoption of racial
quotas”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 (2009) (if employers were permitted to
discard test results too easily, it “would amount to a de facto quota system”); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) (rejecting dissent’s claim that permitting
disparate impact claims based on subjective practices would force employers “to adopt
numerical quotas to avoid liability”).
68 Disparate impacts can also be minimized by careful and professional construction of
employment practices.
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some of the neutral factors may be a cover for discrimination (in line with
one of the theories for the doctrine), or maybe the workforce (and these
“neutral” factors) are structured on the standard male worker,69 or maybe
implicit bias skews the tests.
If both of these adjustments are proper—that is, a smaller standard
deviation and a median skewed against women—extending disparate
impact to White males is not likely to result in a large increase in the
number of employment practices subject to challenge and justification.70
But what should we make of analysis like this? After all, it is all just
theory. By itself, it does not permit us to quantify the actual effect of
expanding disparate impact to include Whites and males. We do not know
much about the universe of employment practices subject to disparate
impact analysis. We do not know the shape of the bell curve. We do not
know the disparate impact of the median employment practice. All that is
true, of course. But in determining legal doctrine, we often have to make
decisions in the absence of firm data. Of course, it is better if firm data is
available and we have become much better in recent years in developing
and relying on good data. But often, we still have to rely on our intuitions,
as we probably have to do in this case. And when we do, even though it is
not ideal, it is better to inform those intuitions with a sensible framework
for thinking about the issue. And that is the value of an analysis like this.
The additional important point for this symposium is that Charlie tees
up issues like this, points out how and why they are important, and makes
us think about them in new and perhaps interesting ways.

69 Similarly, it may also be that employers are more likely to attend to employment
practices with a disparate impact against Whites or males because those practices are more
conspicuous and appear more problematic against the norm of the standard male worker.
70 Another important reason to think expansion of the doctrine to Whites and males will
not lead to a significant increase in the number of employment practices requiring business
justification is that almost all practices are already subject to business justification. The
quantum leap was made by the Americans with Disabilities Act which recognizes a
disparate impact if an employment practice screens out not only a class of individuals with
disabilities, but also any individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). Given the
variety of possible disabilities, this exposes virtually every employment practice to
justification. See also Gail L. Heriot, Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost
Everything Presumptively Illegal (U. San Diego Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 19-421,
2019).
Of course, it is possible to play this tune backwards. Every employment practice has been
subject to a claim that it has to be business justified since 1990, and yet we see very few
cases. So maybe the threat that most employment practices will have to be business
justified is mostly and only theoretical. In the real world, the barriers to disparate impact
(finding a lawyer, funding the case, etc.) may be significant enough to shield most
employment practices.
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VII. CONCLUSION
For more than four decades, Charlie has been a leading scholar on
employment discrimination law. Like many in the academy, I have learned
much from him and, equally important, his work has caused me to rethink
many of my own positions. I began this article by saying that Charlie
found it annoying that I asked him to be introspective about his own
scholarship. I feel no guilt about that. His scholarship has forced all of us
in the field to do the same thing about our scholarship. And you know
what? I hope he continues to annoy us for many years to come.

